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A
fter a long period of feudal rule
by the shoguns, imperial rule
returned to Japan in 1863. The
emperor sought to outfit the nation
with the institutions of a modern state.
His attempt to modernize the military
is what brought Tom Cruise’s character
to  the country in the recent film, The
Last Samurai. A less cinematic part of
the emperor’s reform program was the
founding of the Bank of Japan, to cen-
tralize and govern the issue of currency. 
From the perspective of the 21st
century it may seem only natural that
a central bank should be considered an
integral part of a modern state. But
that wasn’t always the case, and even
at the time when the Bank of Japan
opened its doors for business, such
institutions were not universal. For
instance, with the closing of the Second
Bank of the United States in 1836, the
United States was without a central
bank until the founding of the Federal
Reserve System in 1913.
When the Fed was founded, the
United States joined a club of 20 coun-
tries with central banks. This number
rose rapidly in the second half of the
20th century, as colonial power receded
and the number of sovereign states
grew. By 1997, the world’s group of
central banks numbered 172. One could
even argue that recent decades have
witnessed a new era in which central
banks’ visibility among economic and
government institutions has reached
new highs.
The Federal Reserve’s success at
achieving and sustaining low inflation
under the Chairmanships of Paul
Volcker and Alan Greenspan has
brought heightened public attention to
this country’s central bank. Another
recent phenomenon has been the
efforts by a number of countries to
strengthen their monetary institutions.
Notably, the late 1990s saw major revi-
sions to the laws governing the Banks
of England and Japan.
The Founding of the European
Central Bank
The focus in this period was the refine-
ment of the relationship between a
country’s central bank and its govern-
ment. This focus reflects a growing
appreciation of the importance of
central bank independence. Since all
central banks are created by the author-
ity of a nation’s government, no central
bank is really totally independent. Still,
the ability of central banks to exercise
independent judgment in their pursuit
of monetary and financial stability has
grown considerably in many countries.
An independent central bank is free
to make its own decisions without direct
government intervention in the control
of such monetary policy instruments
as the interbank interest rate. At the
same time, the central bank is typically
accountable to the government for the
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ment is a far cry from the origins of
many central banks, which started as
banks for the government, with a main
mission of facilitating war finances.
The crowning event of this wave of
central bank developments was the cre-
ation in 1998 of the European Central
Bank (ECB). The ECB is unique in that
it is the first supranational central
bank, serving a community of sover-
eign states. An institution of this kind
would not have been thinkable in an
earlier time when central banks were
thought of more as arms of the gov-
ernment treasury than as independent
monetary institutions.
The ECB’s creation raises new ques-
tions about central bank governance.
Just as a consensus was emerging about
the importance of independence for a
national central bank, the ECB came
along and upped the ante. Now the
issue is the relationship between a
central bank and multiple govern-
ments, as well as the relationships
among governments in the operations
of the European monetary system.
The other unique aspect of the ECB
is that it did not simply replace the
national central banks of its member
countries. Rather, the ECB was placed
at the center of the European System
of Central Banks. In this regard, the
ECB’s closest precedent is the Federal
Reserve System. 
Like the ECB, the Fed is a system
of central banks, with 12 regional Banks
and central authority resting with the
Board of Governors. In the Richmond
Fed’s 1999 Annual Report, economist
Marvin Goodfriend examined the sim-
ilarities and differences between these
two institutions, and discussed how
their shared decentralized structure
helps build credibility in the pursuit of
price stability. 
The Makeup of the Eurosystem
The European System of Central Banks
(ESCB), or “the Eurosystem,” came
into being when many of the nations
of the European Union (EU) decided
to adopt a common currency, the Euro.
If these nations were going to abandon
their national currencies in favor of a
single, continent-wide currency, they
needed a new institutional framework
for controlling the supply of money
over the Euro area. The Eurosystem is
made up of the 12 national central
banks in the Euro area (see chart) and
the ECB. 
The terms Eurosystem and Euro-
pean System of Central Banks are
sometimes used interchangeably, but
they actually refer to two slightly dif-
ferent entities. While the Eurosystem
includes only those countries that have
adopted the Euro as their common cur-
rency, the ESCB includes all 25 member
nations of the EU. Three countries —
Denmark, Sweden, and the United
Kingdom — were parties to the origi-
nal treaty that established the Euro and
the ECB but have so far elected not to
give up their national currencies. In
addition, the 10 countries that joined
the EU in 2004 — many of them part
of the former Soviet bloc — have not
yet adopted the Euro.
Only those countries that are part
of the Eurosystem participate in the
formation and implementation of mon-
etary policy in the Euro area. The
broader ESCB provides a forum for
cooperation among all the central
banks in the EU on a number of issues.
It is, for instance, one of the means by
which the 25 member nations coordi-
nate their efforts in bank supervision
and regulation.
The Fed and the Eurosystem
On its face, the monetary policy setup
of the Eurosystem is quite similar to the
Federal Reserve System. The key poli-
cymaking body is the Governing
Council, which is comparable to the
Fed’s Federal Open Market Commit-
tee (FOMC). The Governing Council
is made up of the Governors from the
12 national central banks and the six
members of the ECB’s Executive Board.
Since they represent the distinct eco-
nomic perspectives of their individual
countries, the national central bank gov-
ernors play a role similar to that of the
presidents of the 12 regional Federal
Reserve Banks. Similarly, the Executive
Board is like the Fed’s Board of Gov-
ernors. The members of both of these
Boards are government appointees.
As one might expect, the appoint-
ment process for members of the
ECB’s Executive Board is a little more
complicated, given the need for the
multiple national governments to make
a coordinated decision. In the United
States, the President makes Board
appointments with the consent of the
Senate. ECB Board members, on the
other hand, are appointed through the
consent of the heads of all 12 of the
national governments.
While the makeup of the Fed’s and
Eurosystem’s policymaking committees
are similar, there is a difference in how
they vote on monetary policy decisions.
The FOMC has 12 voting members at
any given meeting. The seven members
of the Board of Governors vote at
every meeting, as does the president of
the New York Fed. The other 11
Reserve Bank presidents vote on a
rotating basis, with four voting in any
given year. In the Eurosystem’s Gov-
erning Council, all the members vote
all the time. As a result, decisionmak-
ing power is more decentralized in the
Eurosystem.
The relationship between the ECB
and the national central banks in the
4 Region Focus • Summer 2004
European Union (EU) Member
States in the European System
of Central Banks (ESCB)
*EU states that have adopted the Euro and participate



























Region Focus Summer 04.ps - 7/12/2004 3:52 PMSummer 2004 • Region Focus 5
Eurosystem is also different from the
relationship between the Reserve
Banks and the Federal Reserve Board
of Governors. The Board of Governors
exercises general supervisory authority
over the Reserve Banks. For instance,
the Board approves the appointments
of Reserve Bank presidents and directly
appoints a third of all Reserve Bank
directors. The ECB does not have the
same sort of central authority in the
Eurosystem. In fact, the governors of
the national central banks have ulti-
mate control over the staff of the ECB.
Such decentralized control was useful
in getting the many countries that
make up the Euro area to agree to give
up their own monetary sovereignty.
Finally, responsibility for the safety
and soundness of a member country’s
banking system lies primarily with that
country’s national government and
central bank. So the ECB does not take
a direct part in bank regulation or in
the provision of emergency credit to
banking institutions. This is different
from the Fed, where the Board has ulti-
mate responsibility for bank supervi-
sion, together with the other federal
bank regulatory agencies. The Reserve
Banks implement bank supervisory and
regulatory policy, but they do so under
“delegated authority” from the Board.
Despite their differences, the
Eurosystem and the Federal Reserve
play a fundamentally similar role. Each
provides a unified monetary framework
for a large, diverse, and integrated
economy. In addition to the formulation
and implementation of monetary policy,
both systems also provide infrastructure
for the clearing and settlement of inter-
bank payments, facilitating the
integration of commercial and financial
activity over wide geographic areas. In
the case of the Eurosystem, the ECB’s
“TARGET” system links the interbank
payment mechanisms of the national
central banks.
Of course, the most significant sim-
ilarity between the two institutions is
their regional structure. According to
Goodfriend, this brings distinct bene-
fits. Perhaps most important, the
regional structure can enhance credi-
bility. Credibility is important, because
it enables a central bank to better
manage the public’s expectations
regarding inflation. Managing expecta-
tions, in turn, facilitates the achieve-
ment of price stability. 
Historically, central banks have
sometimes come under political pres-
sure to stray from price stability, often
to help finance government deficits
with inflationary monetary policy. The
diffusion of power in a system of
regional central banks like the Fed or
the Eurosystem, says Goodfriend,
“makes it more difficult for outside
pressure to be brought to bear on a
central bank.”
After presiding over high and vari-
able inflation throughout much of the
1970s, the Federal Reserve faced the
daunting task of credibly claiming that
it could achieve the goal of price sta-
bility. But over a long period beginning
in the 1980s, the Fed brought inflation
down and kept it low in a way that con-
vinced the public that earlier infla-
tionary policies were unlikely to return.
The ECB and the Eurosystem, by def-
inition, came into being without such
an institutional history. So in order to
establish credibility as an inflation
fighter, it had to do so through other
means. Its founding document, the
Maastricht Treaty, states that the
primary objective of the Eurosystem
will be to maintain price stability. This
is a less ambiguous mandate than has
ever been given to the Fed. 
It’s important to note, though, that
however credibility is established, the
dispersed power of the regional struc-
ture should help in its preservation.
This is true for both the Federal
Reserve System and the Eurosystem.
The regional structure also allows a
central bank to have a significant pres-
ence in the diverse areas served by the
common monetary policy. This regional
presence has many beneficial effects.
Contact with and knowledge of regional
economic conditions permit diverse per-
spectives to enter policy deliberations.
And the regional presence also makes
it easier for a central bank to commu-
nicate with and explain its policies to a
wide set of participants in the economy.
Specialized regional knowledge can also
be useful for monitoring conditions in
the banking industry to help make
prudent decisions about the provision
of emergency central bank credit to
private financial institutions.
The Future of Supranational
Central Banks
Should we think of the design of the
Eurosytem as a conscious attempt to
mimic the Federal Reserve, the way
Japan’s creation of a central bank in the
19th century was directly modeled on
European central banks of the time?
Probably not. Given the distinct polit-
ical and institutional histories of the
countries involved, the regional struc-
ture adopted was probably the only
practical way to link the countries in a
unified monetary system. The similar-
ities seem to follow naturally from the
comparable size and diversity of the
U.S. and EU economies. Perhaps, as
other regions experience growth and
economic integration, and as the
economies of other large nations con-
tinue to grow, we will see more entries
into the ranks of regional systems of
central banks. RF
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